ple's choices. Keren and Wagenaar (1987; also Keren, A variety of experiments have demonstrated that 1991) found that violations of utility theory reflecting people's choices among gambles differ according to ''certainty'' and ''possibility'' effects observed under whether the gamble is to be played just once (the unique conditions disappear under repeated play. Weunique case) or multiple times (the repeated case). The dell and Bockenholt (1990) found that nonnormative reason for this difference appears to be that people reversals in preference induced by different response are acting in each case so as to increase the likelihood modes (choice versus pricing) are reduced under rethat the chosen alternative will leave them better off peated play. Joag, Mowen, and Gentry (1990) found than the nonchosen alternative. This paper explores that subjects in both a gambling task and a simulated four themes that bear on the difference between industrial purchasing task combined information unique and repeated gambles. The first traces the historical and theoretical role of weighted averaging in about probabilities and outcomes multiplicatively for risky choice. The second defends the usefulness of decisions with multiple plays but additively for deciprobability-based rules for choices involving aspira-sions involving a single play. Redelmeier and Tversky tion levels. The third presents the idea that choices (1990, 1992) found that physicians make different deciunder risk may reflect dual criteria, one based in sions depending on whether they are deciding on a weighted averaging and the other based in stochastic case-by-case basis or making aggregate decisions for control. The fourth challenges the conventional crite-groups of patients.
The foregoing experiments confirm that subjects tional. ᭧ 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
choose differently under unique and repeated conditions. They also support the idea that subjects choose differently in the two situations in order to increase Some years ago, I published a theoretical note the likelihood that the chosen alternative will leave (Lopes, 1981) that took issue with the proposition that them better off. As Keren (1991) put it, the reason his rationality requires one's choices under risk to conform subjects responded differently was ''not necessarily the to the axioms of expected utility theory. My claim was unique-repeated distinction per se but rather the dethat sensible people often base their choices on the gree of risk involved'' (p. 301), an assessment his subprobability of coming out ahead. In particular, I argued jects appeared to base on their probability of not winthat sensible people might reject single plays of gamning at all or of winning only the smallest amount. bles with high expected utilities and low probabilities Similarly, Wedell and Bockenholt's subjects often justiof winning but accept multiple plays of the same gamfied their decisions by pointing out that the ''chances bles if the net probability of winning were acceptably of winning something'' increased with more plays. high.
At one time, my note on the short run seemed isoThe article was controversial and drew some fire lated from my other research, a solitary jeer from the (Tversky & Bar-Hillel, 1983) . It also stimulated a conback of the crowd: ''The Emperor has no clothes!'' But ference (Beach, Vlek, & Wagenaar, 1988) and several now I see connections everywhere. One paragraph in experiments that compared people's gamble preferparticular stands out as prescient of views I would disences under unique (one play) and repeated (multiple cover anew years later. In it I speculated on how the play) conditions. All found the distinction to affect peomodel of rational choice might be revised:
ables such as efficiency and, what has been stressed in this Maurice Allais, a French economist, was also workpaper, probability of coming out ahead. . . . Thus the conceping in the early 1950s to describe linearity in a way tion of rationality will come to rest more squarely on essenthat would be intuitively transparent. But his object tially subjective judgments about how diverse -and somewas to demonstrate the inadequacy of the assumption.
times competing -criteria combine or trade off with one another. (Lopes, 1981, p. 385) Allais saw that linearity implies that preferences among gambles should be invariant over additive and Although time has qualified the details of these specu-multiplicative rescaling of the probabilities. In other lations, they foreshadow four themes that have per-words, if we take a pair of gambles and reduce the sisted in my thinking: first, the importance of weighted probabilities of winning in both by either subtracting averaging in risky choice; second, the role of probabil-a constant or dividing by a constant, the relative attracity-based rules for choices involving aspiration levels; tiveness of the gambles should not change. The thought third, the idea of dual or multiple criteria for risky problems that Allais invented (1952 Allais invented ( /1979 ) showed choice; and fourth, skepticism concerning the conven-clearly that people's preferences do change when probational criteria by which choices are judged to be ratio-bilities are rescaled. When the probabilities of achievnal or irrational. These themes will provide the struc-ing desirable outcomes are large, people tend to be cauture for the present article.
tious and prefer certainty or as near to that as can be had. When the probabilities are small, people trade off
LINEARITY AND AVERAGING IN RISKY CHOICE
small amounts of probability in favor of larger prizes. They say, in essence, ''What the hell, I might as well Five decades have elapsed since von Neumann and go for it!'' Morgenstern (1944) revived academic interest in the Although Allais' paradoxes (as they are now called) expected utility model. During the first 35 years, econo-were compelling in the sense that even staunch advomists, statisticians, and decision analysts elaborated cates of expected utility theory fell into their trap, they the theory and applied it to decision aiding. This was did not compel reexamination of the theory. Instead, a time of theoretical complacency even though the most blinders went on and the rhetorical volume was turned telling challenges to the theory had been issued rela-up in the form of ''in-principle arguments'' concerning tively early (Allais, 1952 (Allais, /1979 Ellsberg, 1961) and the potential consequences of violating expected utility even though behavioral experiments were regularly axioms. One of these-the Dutch book theorem-consignaling the theory's descriptive inadequacy. The next tended that if people's ''degrees of belief'' do not conform 10 years saw intense theoretical activity directed at to the laws of probability, they will be liable to accept improving the model's descriptive accuracy and at betcombinations of bets that guarantee a net loss. For ter understanding the mathematical options for incorexample, someone who believes that each of two opposporating psychological variables into the model. The ing candidates has a 60% chance of winning an election most recent 5 years have been marked by quiet accepshould be willing to bet at 4:6 on each, thereby losing tance of modeling approaches that might once have no matter who wins. Another-the money pump argubeen rejected as irrational and by a highly productive ment-concerned intransitive preferences. Suppose blurring of the disciplinary line between economists that a person has the preferences, C ú B ú A ú C. The and psychologists.
person could be given A, then be offered B for A plus It is not necessary to review all the developments of a penny, then be offered C for B plus a penny, then be the last 15 years. We need only trace the fate of one offered A for C plus a penny, and so on until the unwary assumption that is central to both expected utility themoney pump was sucked dry. ory and subjectively expected utility theory (Savage, It was not until the late 1970s that the linearity 1954). This is the assumption that people's preferences logjam was broken. In particular, 1979 saw the publiamong gambles will be linear in probability (either obcation of an edited volume (Allais & Hagen, 1979) conjective or subjective). Theorists in the early years vied taining an English translation of Allais' original criwith one another to construct formal descriptions of tique of linearity along with commentary by many wellthe requirement (packaged as axioms bearing names known advocates of expected utility theory and further such as independence, substitution, and the surething critique of the theory by Allais and others. A series of principle) that would appeal directly to intuition and conferences (the biennial FUR series on the Foundathus provide normative support for the theory. Demontions of Utility and Risk Theory) followed that has prostrating such support was important because if linearvided a forum for exploring nonlinear extensions of exity could be justified, entire distributions could be repected utility theory. Around the same time, Karplaced by their means when complex gambles were analyzed.
markar (1978, 1979) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed ''weighted utility'' theories that fol-decumulative weighting functions in prospect theory.
2 But decumulative weighting is also descriptively supelowed up on the earlier suggestion by Edwards (1962) that Allais-type preferences could be modeled by as-rior to weighted utility for representing the cognitive sources of behavioral nonlinearity. For example, decusuming that the psychological impact (or weight) of probabilities on decisions is a nonlinear function of mulative weighting can capture dispositional differences in the importance that different people attach to probability magnitude. The version by Kahneman and Tversky (prospect theory) was especially influential in avoiding bad outcomes versus achieving good outcomes (Lopes, 1987 (Lopes, , 1990 . It also relates in a natural way to stimulating interest in descriptive models of risky choice.
descriptions of risky choice that focus on risk dimensions and lexicographic processes (Lopes, 1995) . Weighted utility was heavily criticized by economists, however, because the model predicted violations As Birnbaum, Coffey, Mellers, and Weiss (1992) pointed out, decumulative weighting is a form of differof dominance.
1 A more acceptable approach to nonlinear weighting was soon suggested independently by entially weighted averaging (Anderson, 1981; Birnbaum, 1972; Oden, 1971) . Averaging models in general several economists (Allais, 1986; Quiggin, 1982; Yaari, 1987) and has since been explored extensively by others capture the integrated response of a decision maker to the individual elements of a complex stimulus. Expec-(e.g., Chew, Karni, & Safra, 1987; Luce, 1988; Schmeidler, 1989; Segal, 1989; Wakker, 1990) . This ap-tation models constrain the expression of individual values to the utility function or to ''subjective probabiliproach, commonly called ''decumulative weighting'' or ''rank dependent weighting,'' weights the probability of ties'' that obey the quite restrictive axioms of probability theory. Even when probability weights are introa potential outcome according to both the magnitude of its probability and the position of the outcome in the duced descriptively (as in weighted utility), they tend to be interpreted normatively in terms of ''underset of possible outcomes.
The difference between weighted utility and decumu-weighting'' or ''overweighting.'' With decumulative weights, however, deviations from linearity are not so lative weighting is easily conveyed by example. Consider a gamble offering a 5% chance of winning $1, a likely to be attributed to errors in weighting. Although decumulative weighting functions can be interpreted 90% chance of winning $10, and a 5% chance of winning $100. Computing the expected value in the ordinary perceptually as arising from probability distortion (Quiggin, 1982) or patterns of underweighting and way, we get: .05($1) / .90($10) / .05($100) Å $14.05. If we apply standard nonlinear weights to the gamble, overweighting (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) , they also lend themselves to nonperceptual interpretations such the probabilities are replaced by weights that are a function of probability magnitude. Thus, the chance of as representing attitudes toward risk (Yaari, 1987) or expressing a decision maker's preference for security obtaining the worst outcome is assigned the same weight as the chance of receiving the best outcome. (Allais, 1986; Lopes, 1990; Lopes, 1995) . Alternatively, we can compute the expectation by noticing that the gamble offers $1 for sure plus a 95% chance ASPIRATION AND PROBABILITY-BASED of an additional $9 plus a 5% chance of an additional (1991) axiomatized a rankthe weights in weighted utility usually do not conform to the axioms of probability theory. Although weighted utility technically includes dependent and sign-dependent representation for choices among uncertain alternatives that includes cumulative prospect theory as a subjectively expected utility as a special case, the version of weighted utility needed to account for Allais-type preferences does not. special case.
using a two-valued utility function, 3 they preferred to come term in an infinite series contributes equally to the infinite result: treat the problem as one of maximizing probabilities. What they found is that the decision maker cannot afford to play cautiously. If he hazards only small bets, EV Å 1/2 $2 / 1/4 $4 / 1/8 $8 / 1/16 $16 the casino will eventually deplete his stake. Instead, / . . . 1/n$2 n . . . he must play boldly, staking either everything on each bet or (if the target can be reached with a single bet) Å 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / . . . 1 . . . . staking as much as needed to meet the target.
Procedures that maximize the probability of achievIf we then compare the various solutions, we find that ing a target outcome subject to stated constraints are each applies a mathematical operation that differenstudied in a field of mathematics called ''stochastic contially affects terms with large outcomes and small probtrol.'' Although this is a relatively new field in terms abilities. Diminishing marginal utility compresses of technical development, probability-based solutions large outcomes more than small outcomes. Probability can be found among those that were suggested for the thresholds effectively exclude all terms above the critifamous eighteenth century thought problem now cal probability level. Solutions concerning the seller's known as the St. Petersburg paradox:
bankroll cap outcomes at a finite level so that the con-A fair coin is tossed until it lands tails (on the nth toss) at which tributions of terms beyond the cap diminish to zero. involving the later, larger outcomes. In other words, Probabilitists of the late seventeenth century believed all four solutions focus operationally on terms reprethat the worth of a gamble is given by its expected senting events that in (almost) all likelihood will not value. The St. Petersburg game showed this idea to be occur. flawed, however, because it was immediately apparent There was, however, a qualitatively different soluto all that the game is worth much, much less than its tion also contributed by Buffon (Todhunter, 1865). Bufexpected value-which is, in fact, infinite.
fon approached the problem of estimating the value of Many scholars took up the challenge of explaining the game empirically by hiring a child to toss a coin the discrepancy between the low apparent worth and 2000 times and record the sequence of outcomes. The the infinite expected value of the St. Petersburg game. experiment allowed him to conclude that the value of The classical expected utility solution was offered by the game was likely to be quite small. Some 230 years Daniel Bernoulli (1738/1967) and independently by later, not knowing about Buffon, I too became curious Cramer (cited in Bernoulli, 1738 Bernoulli, /1967 . Both made use about the empirical value of the game and ran a similar of the idea that money has ''diminishing marginal util-experiment on a computer. The experiment, which conity'' and that substitution of utility for monetary value stituted the original impetus for my note on the short would appropriately diminish the value of the game. run, approached the problem from the perspective of There were, however, a variety of other contemporary an inexhaustibly rich seller-I had in mind Scrooge solutions (reviewed in Daston, 1980; Samuelson, 1977;  McDuck. Using hundreds of millions of trials in a Todhunter, 1865) not involving utility. D'Alembert, Monte Carlo simulation, I found that even if the game Buffon and Condorcet each proposed that the value of were sold at the discount price of $100 to many, many the game would be small if probabilities smaller than buyers, it would constitute an almost certain money some critical threshold were ignored. Fontaine, Buffon maker for Scrooge and no bargain at all for the vast and later Poisson proposed that the value of the game majority of buyers (Lopes, 1981) . would be objectively small because the seller's fortune
In discussing Buffon's strategy, Samuelson calls the must be finite. Buffon also suggested that the value of experiments ''childish ways to avoid the true infinity the game would be small because the time available in the Petersburg expectations'' (1977, p. 52). I do not for play would necessarily be finite.
suppose Samuelson would judge my replication any Although these solutions seem very different, they more kindly. Still, one can reach the same conclusion take a common approach to reducing the game's infi-that Buffon and I reached by the more respectable (stonite value. If we write out the expression for computing chastic control) route of asking what price a buyer the expected value, we find that each probability/out-should pay if she wishes to hold her chances of taking a loss to some specified low value. Consider first what would happen if a buyer worth $1 million relied on the would need to toss at least 19 heads before the first (if they are quantile utility maximizers) than people with lesser preferences for risk. tail, an unlikely event having probability 1/2 20 . The In introducing the utility mass and quantile utility vastly more likely outcome is that she would reduce models, Manski observed that ''the atmosphere surher fortune to a very small sum (e.g., £$64 with probarounding the expected utility model is highly charged. bility 1 0 1/2 6 Å .984). Alternatively, we can suppose Attitudes seem to depend on an interplay of ideology, that our potential buyer finds a discount seller (my intuition, and pragmatism'' (Manski, 1988, p. 82) . I can Scrooge McDuck) who is willing to sell her as many only agree. Two years after the publication of my note, plays of the game as she wants very cheaply. As I dis- Tversky and Bar Hillel (1983) detailed a number of covered belatedly after publishing my own work, this disagreements that they had with my stance on the is a situation that Allais (1979) analyzed previously in difference between long-run and short-run decision terms of the ''theory of ruin.'' He showed that a player making. In their paper, they endorsed the classic view with a bankroll of $1 million who keeps purchasing (described above) that one can dispense with the St. plays of the game for $33 each will be ruined with Petersburg game by taking into account the seller's probability .9999 provided that settlement is made finite resources, and they reiterated the standard posiafter every game (i.e., that purchases cannot be made tion that whatever objections one may have to applying on credit).
the principle of expected value maximization to unique Although stochastic control problems are not much choices, those objections do not apply to the modern studied by psychologists, they provide an alternative (axiomatic) principle of expected utility maximization. model for explaining decision making under risk. For
Suffice it to say these many years later that the intenexample, Bottom, Bontempo, and Holtgrave (1989) pretion of my note was explicitly and exactly to confront sented subjects with variations of the St. Petersburg such views. I neither repent nor recant the opinions game that were designed to allow a test between utilexpressed. ity-based decision rules and a probability-based ''expecThere is, however, a point of disagreement that I tation heuristic'' suggested by Treisman (1983) by would like to clarify concerning an anecdote from Samwhich subjects set bids by estimating the toss on which uelson (1963) in which he recounts offering some coltails will appear. The results were generally supportive leagues to bet $200 to $100 that the side of a coin they of the expectation heuristic or of a similarly motivated specified would not appear at the first toss. One of his ''bid protection heuristic'' by which subjects set bids companions replied to the offer roughly as follows that give them an even chance of coming out ahead.
(Samuelson, 1963, p. 109): More generally, the results supported the notion that, in assessing the worth of the St. Petersburg game, peo-I won't bet because I would feel the $100 loss more than the $200 gain. But I'll take you on if you promise to let me make ple attend mostly to events that are likely to happen 100 such bets. . . . One toss is not enough to make it reasonably rather than events that are unlikely to happen.
sure that the law of averages will turn out in my favor. But in In my original note on the short run, I spoke more a hundred tosses of a coin, the law of large numbers will make or less interchangeably about decision rules aimed at it a darn good bet. I am, so to speak, virtually sure to come out ahead in such a sequence, and that is why I accept the sequence maximizing the probability of achieving some target while rejecting the single toss.
level (for example, maximizing the probability of coming out ahead) and decision rules aimed at maximizing Samuelson disapproved of his colleague's decision. Insome percentile of a distribution (for example, max-deed, he considered it irrational and presented a theoimizing the median outcome). Manski (1988) has re-rem to that effect. cently described formalized versions of these rules as, Samuelson stated the theorem as follows: ''If at each respectively, a ''utility mass model'' and a ''quantile income or wealth level within a range, the expected utility model.'' Manski's models are interesting mathe-utility of a certain investment or bet is worse than matically because they are consistent with the exis-abstention, then no sequence of such independent ventence of a preference ordering over actions (and hence tures (that leaves one within the specified range of inare candidate models for rational choice) and because come) can have a favorable expected utility. Thus, if their predictions are invariant under ordinal transfor-you would always refuse to take favorable odds on a mation of utility. They also lead to generalizations of single toss, you must rationally refuse to participate in conventional economic ideas about riskiness and risk any (finite) sequence of such tosses'' (p. 111). He also preference that are psychologically plausible. In partic-warned in a footnote (p. 112) against the ''undue exular, they imply that people with greater preferences trapolation'' of the theorem that might occur if one were for risk will either set higher target levels (if they are to ignore the restriction ''if at each income or wealth level within a range.'' utility mass maximizers) or maximize higher quantiles My intent in discussing the case was to defend Sam-terms of decumulative weighting. Thus, we face the spectre of indeterminacy-and maybe even an embaruelson's colleague against the irrationality charge and to cast my lot with those who sometimes choose to max-rassment of psychologically plausible models. On the other hand, being out on two limbs is less precarious imize the probability of a gain. Tversky and Bar Hillel seemed to suppose that my contrariness was occa-than being out on one, and it may be that both models are needed to produce a descriptively complete picture sioned by the sort of ''undue extrapolation'' against which Samuelson had warned. In this, they were mis-of human risk taking.
To illustrate the point, it is useful to turn briefly to taken. Samuelson's restriction applies to the range of asset positions that might be reached as a result of work I have been doing over the last decade on people's preferences among multioutcome gambles. My initial playing the proposed sequence of bets. In the case at hand, this would run from $10,000 below (100 losses) to interest was in discovering how risk attitudes, particularly risk aversion, are related to preferences for dif-$20,000 above (100 wins) the colleague's then-current asset position. Thus, the restriction entails only that ferent distributions of outcomes. Although most authors who have studied distributional variables have the colleague's reaction to the single bet would have been the same had he happened on that fateful day to focused on point-measures such as variance or skewness, I preferred to think of my stimuli in graphical be a little poorer or a little richer than he actually was.
In arguing their case, Tversky and Bar Hillel (1983, terms, as a kind of cumulative distribution that welfare economists use for comparing income levels p. 715) provided an example of a utility function that violates the restriction on the theorem and showed that across groups. This work showed that judgments of riskiness as well as preferences that would convenit would also accept the sequence while rejecting the single bet. To the extent that they intended this to tionally be labeled ''risk averse'' in the expected utility sense could be predicted equally well by the relative serve as a counterexample, their argument was with Samuelson and not with me since it was he who applied likelihood and severity of the worst outcomes in the distributions (Lopes, 1984) . the theorem to his colleague. But personally, I see no reason to suppose that the economic reasoning of a These findings led naturally to the idea of modeling risk aversion in terms of the relative attention paid to ''distinguished scholar'' who lunches with Nobel laureates would be radically affected by minor shifts in the worst and the best outcomes of gambles. My main method was to explain subjects' preferences among varwealth.
I should acknowledge, however, that Samuelson's ious stimuli by relating their stated rationales (protocols) for preferring one gamble over another to the discolleague was not entirely blameless in having been labeled irrational for he reportedly assured Sam-tributional characteristics of the stimuli. Although this work was done before I encountered the idea of decuuelson that he wished to ''stand with Daniel Bernoulli, Bentham, Ramsey, v. Neumann, Marschak, mulative weighting, it already contained the ideas that people think of gambles cumulatively (or as I would and Savage'' in ''maximizing the expected or average value of the utility of all possible outcomes'' (Sam-now say, decumulatively) and that ''risk aversion'' reflects differential weighting of bad outcomes rather uelson, 1963, p. 110) . I can well attest that it is not a comfortable experience to stand with the collection than diminishing marginal utility (Lopes, , 1987 .
To get a sense of how subjects are reasoning, it is of money pumps, Dutch book victims, and assorted ne'er-do-wells who feel no obligation to obey the useful to let them speak for themselves. Below are four protocols from subjects who were choosing between the axioms and theorems of expected utility theory. Still, I hope Samuelson's colleague would join me in de-two multioutcome lotteries shown in Fig. 1 . Each lottery has 100 lottery tickets (tally marks representing fending his choice. Indeed, one of the strongest arguments I can find against the principle of expected probability) distributed over approximately equally spaced outcomes ranging between zero and $200. The utility maximization is that it considers such an eminently sensible decision to be irrational. subjects in the experiment were graduate students recruited from various graduate departments. Each ex-CONFLICT AND THE IDEA OF pressed preferences among a large set of gamble pairs
A DUAL CRITERION
and also provided written rationales at the point of choice for a subset of the gamble pairs. In the experiHaving just argued the merits (both normative and ment, lotteries were unnamed: subjects referred to descriptive) of probability-based rules for explaining them by position on the page. the St. Petersburg paradox and Samuelson's offer, I S3: (chooses peaked): I like to be able to count on getting a must now fess up that people's responses in both of moderate amount rather than choosing to get much higher or much lower. these situations could equally well be explained in nal probability-based reasoning (focus on likelihoods of achieving particular targets). Indeed, although I often found myself struggling with this indeterminacy verbally when I was writing about subjects' choices, the theoretical indeterminacy was not apparent to me until Sandra Schneider and I (Schneider & Lopes, 1986) investigated the risk preferences of subjects who were preselected for extreme risk aversion. Our data indicated very clearly that there was an asymmetry between gain and loss preferences in which preferences for losses were neither identical to those for gains (as decumulative weighting suggests) nor mirror reflected (as suggested by the S-shaped utility function of prospect theory).
The reasons for the gain/loss asymmetry can be  FIG. 1 . Example of a pair of multioutcome lotteries. Each lottery found in the subjects' protocols for loss pairs. Below are has 100 lottery tickets (represented by tally marks) and an expected protocols from the four subjects we encountered above value of $100. The amounts at the left of each row represent the but this time choosing between versions of the rectanprize that is paid if a ticket from that row is selected. The names gular and peaked lotteries in which the outcomes are below the lotteries are for expository purposes only. Subjects referred to lotteries by position on the page (e.g., left or right).
all losses.
S3 (chooses rectangular): This is a somewhat arbitrary choice. They're so similar, but I might as well make even my chances S7: I choose the [peaked] because it offers a majority of chances for high or low losses. of at least an amount somewhere between $40.00 and $159.00.
S7: This was a difficult choice-I finally chose the [peaked] beThe odds of winning are best between those dollar amounts, and cause it seemed ''safer'' than the other lottery. Since it seems the odds indicate an excellent chance of winning an amount likely I would lose some amount, I decided to opt for the lottery between $80.00 and $119.00. The other lottery does not offer as that favors a loss of less than $135.00. The other lottery is evenly good of odds.
weighted and somehow that seems ''riskier'' to me. S8: (chooses peaked): Too many chances of getting a lower prize S8: It is very hard to select one or the other. I selected the in the [rectangular] lottery.
[rectangular] because it gives you more chances of paying zero S11: I'll take the [peaked] . It looks like there's a better chance or even under $50. I'm still unsure that I selected the right one. to get at least something. S11: I go back and forth on this, the gain on improving the chances on a low loss increases the chance of a higher loss. I
There are several points to be noticed in these protopick the [peaked] to try to reduce the higher loss.
cols. First, all four of these subjects chose the distributionally less risky peaked lottery. In general, most subSeveral points of difference can be discerned between these protocols and the analogous gain protocols. First, jects were risk averse (or ''security-minded'' in my terms) for gain pairs. Second, subjects often signaled choices for these pairs were not uniformly risk averse.
Two subjects chose the peaked and two chose the rectconcern with avoiding zero or low outcomes. This was especially true for pairs involving asymmetric gambles angular. Over the entire group of 14 subjects, 13 chose the peaked for gains whereas only 6 chose it for losses. in which there were large differences between the numbers of tickets for bad and good outcomes. Third, there Second, some subjects focused on avoiding large losses (consistent with heavier weighting on the worst outwas often explicit reference to decumulative reasoning (e.g., ''at least an amount,'' ''at least something''). comes), others on achieving low or zero losses (consistent with maximizing the chances of achieving an aspiFourth, there was also often explicit reference to the likelihood of achieving particular target or aspiration ration level), and some (e.g., S11) focused on both.
Third, subjects often expressed conflict and difficulty levels (e.g., ''able to count on getting a moderate amount,'' ''an excellent chance of winning an amount in choosing or lack of confidence in their choices for losses. Comments of this sort were extremely rare in between $80.00 and $119.00''). Aspiration levels were especially likely to be mentioned when one of the avail-gain protocols.
Without the data on loss choices, the indeterminacy able choices provided a clear reference point such as a $100 sure thing or a $70 minimum.
between decumulative weighting and probabilitybased reasoning might be unresolvable because both In reading gain protocols such as these it is often difficult to discriminate between statements that sig-classes of rule prescribe the same choices for the generically risk averse person. In the choice pair at hand, nal decumulative weighting (i.e., focus on low outcomes and reasoning in inequalities) and statements that sig-for example, security-minded decumulative weighting would amplify the differences at the low end (5 zero the chief financial officers of Fortune 500 firms and found that the most common definition of investment tickets versus 1 zero ticket) and consequently favor the risk was the probability of not achieving a target rate peaked lottery. Similarly, a risk averse utility mass of return. Similarly, risks in medical, industrial, and maximizer would set a low aspiration level and a risk environmental contexts are often assessed by measures averse quantile utility maximizer would choose a low such as death rates and accident rates. quantile leading both to prefer the peaked to the rectAlthough it is rarely noted, a unifying theme of Alangular (Manski, 1988) . With the loss data, however, lais' approach to risk taking is that prudent decision the indeterminacy disappears. The conflict that is exmakers will trade off the expectation of monetary gains pressed directly in protocols and indirectly in choices (or utility gains) against the probability of failing to that veer unpredictably from risk averse to risk seeking achieve important goals. For example, Allais (1952/ strongly suggests that subjects attend to both criteria 1979, p. 53) called on the concept of bold play in disand find it difficult to choose between them.
cussing a traveler who must get to Paris but finds himCorroborating evidence concerning the asymmetry self stranded in Marseilles with only $10. He argued between gains and losses may be found in a variety of that for decision makers facing the immediate necesexperiments. Parametric studies of reflection comparsity of turning a small sum into a large sum, gambling ing people's preferences for gain gambles with preferat the best available odds may provide the only rational ences for analogous loss gambles have often found that avenue to success even if the odds are objectively disadgain preferences exhibit strong risk aversion whereas vantageous. On the other hand, he described his profesloss preferences are weaker (nearer to risk neutrality) sional recommendations to a firm prospecting for oil in or more variable (Cohen, Jaffray, & Said, 1987 ; Her-the Sahara by saying: ''there is little point in entering shey & Schoemaker, 1980; Weber & Bottom, 1989 , ex-a game with a positive expectation if there is from the periment 3). Parametric studies of framing have also outset a high chance of being forced out of it by ruin'' found that preferences are predominately risk averse (1952/1979, p. 506) . Indeed, one may find an echo of for problems described in terms of gains but variable this concern with the trade off between mathematical across problems described in terms of losses (Fagley & expectation and probability of success in his defense of Miller, 1987; Maule, 1989; Miller & Fagley, 1991 ; the Allais paradox: ''Just as it may be conceived that Schepanski & Kelsey, 1990; Schneider, 1992) . In addi-a very great effort is justified to perfect a whole, where tion, Budescu and Weiss (1987) found that systematic only a detail remains to be remedied, . . . it may simicycles of intransitivity that sometimes occur for gains larly be considered that it is in no way irrational to (Montgomery, 1977; Ranyard, 1982; Tversky, 1969) do accept a heavy reduction of possible gain as the price of not reflect for losses even when analysis is restricted achieving certainty, although this same reduction to subjects whose preferences are reliably reflective.
would not be felt acceptable for the same increase in the My conclusion is that an adequate descriptive theory probability of gain if that increase is far removed from of risk taking will need to be a dual criterion theory. certainty. '' (1952/1979, p. 102) . Elsewhere (Lopes, 1990; Lopes, 1995) I have proposed
The canons of good science dictate that simple models one such theory-called SP/A theory-that combines are to be preferred to complex models, all else being a decumulative weighting process (the SP or security-equal. But all else is not equal if different models shine in potential part of SP/A) with a process that maximizes different spheres. It is a false economy to choose between the probability of achieving an aspiration level (the A probability-based models and models based on weighted or aspiration part of SP/A). Although a detailed exposi-averaging when observation and good sense suggest that both apply. To borrow some sentiments that Manski extion of SP/A theory falls outside the scope of what I pressed in defending his explorations of the utility mass want to accomplish here, suffice it to say that this parand quantile utility models, ''it seems quixotic to think ticular dual criterion theory does a creditable job of that any model as simple as expected utility, quantile describing both preferences and reasoning patterns utility, or utility mass should be able to explain [the] across a wide variety of behavioral phenomena.
diverse and complex aspects of behavior under uncerDescription aside, however, dual criterion models are tainty '' (1988, p. 82) . Likewise, it is simplistic to suppose also normatively attractive for the many business and that any one model is the royal road to rationality. Inpublic policy decisions in which risk and return trade stead, each model ''illuminates a possible mode of rational off. It often seems sensible in such contexts to construe behavior under uncertainty'' (Manski, 1988, p. 82) . return in terms of an expected outcome or average ben-
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efit and to construe risk in terms of the probability of an unacceptable outcome. For example, Petty and Scott
The two classes of decision rule discussed in this essay conflict with the requirements of expected utility (cited in Payne, Laughhunn, & Crum, 1980) Coherence theorists also tend to characterize reality reasoning that neither is likely to leave him better off, discretely so that it will fit neatly into the absolute what dire consequence will follow? Why must a scien-''trues'' and ''falses'' of classical logic. Although some tist who prefers to evaluate data sets by medians rather (like Dawes) are willing to acknowledge the appeal of than means be branded ''irrational'' if she applies the logics that treat some propositions as ''indecidable,'' few same policy in evaluating personal risks? Would any are comfortable with the idea that propositions can be of these decision makers be better off practically if they true to varying degrees (Lukasiewwicz, 1930; Zadeh, gave in to fifty years of browbeating and entrusted their 1965). Discrete logics have their problems, however, fates to expected utility?
when they are applied to propositions that are not cut According to Hammond (1994) , most judgment reand dried. One such example is the ''paradox of the search has espoused one of two complementary metaheap'' described by the Greek philosopher Eubulides. theories about rationality: ''coherence'' which stresses
The paradox runs as follows: (1) One pebble does not the internal consistency among a person's beliefs and make a heap; (2) Adding one pebble to something that preferences or ''correspondence'' which stresses the is not a heap will not make it a heap; (3) Therefore, no empirical accuracy of a person's judgments. Whereas number of pebbles makes a heap. If we take (1) and coherence values reasons, correspondence values (2) to be true absolutely, (3) follows by mathematical rightness. Thus, someone whose judgments flow logiinduction. But (3) is clearly absurd. cally from an empirically impoverished but internally As Oden (1988) pointed out, the proof Samuelson consistent set of beliefs would be considered rational offered for the theorem concerning his colleague has by the coherence standard no matter how poorly her the same form and is liable to the same problem. 4 Samjudgments match reality. On the other hand, someone uelson's logic ran as follows: with a rich hodgepodge of beliefs, each individually chosen for usefulness in solving some particular probIf you will not accept one toss, you cannot accept two -since lem, would be absolved by the correspondence stanthe latter could be thought of as consisting of the (unwise) decision to accept one plus the open decision to accept a secdard for inconsistencies lurking in the mix.
ond. Even if you were stuck with the first outcome, you would As Hammond points out, research in the coherence cut your further (utility) losses and refuse the terminal throw. framework tends to conclude that people are judgment- (Samuelson, 1963, p. 4) ally incompetent without addressing the practical imThe proof is by mathematical induction: pact of the observed or inferred inconsistencies. One reason for this is that coherence is commonly portrayed R 1 you prefer not to take one bet.
as a precondition for correspondence. Dawes (1988) , and R 1 r R 2 even if you have one bet, you prefer not to take for example, describes the relation between consistency a second. and R 2 r R 3 even if you have two bets, you prefer not to take and correctness as follows: ''By the logical law of contraa third. . . . diction, reasoning processes based on the same eviand R n01 r R n even if you have n 0 1 bets, you prefer not to dence that reach contradictory conclusions are irratiotake one more.
nal. And because reality cannot be characterized in con-І ∀ n R n for any n you prefer not to take n such bets. tradictory ways, irrational thinking is erroneous Although the proof form is logically sound when applied thinking. A proposition about reality cannot be both to premises that are absolutely true, it fails when the true and false'' (p. 9).
truth of one or more premises is not absolute. Thus, According to the coherence metatheory, people whose even if we take it as absolutely true that ''one pebble decision processes lead to contradictory conclusions live does not make a heap,'' the truth of the premise that in peril of encountering a statistically astute scoundrel ''adding one pebble to something that is not a heap will who will turn them into a money pump or trap them not make it a heap'' cannot be absolute-for otherwise with a Dutch book. Kyburg (1978) has countered, howthe induction would be good. Likewise, even if we stipuever, that arguments of this sort rest on the (usually unstated) behavioral assumption that people feel compelled to act on their beliefs. That a person might main-
